The Future of African Development: Africa in a Multi-Polar World

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Executive Summary

Development stands on the precipice of a changing world, in which Africa must choose its next steps carefully. As the global order is increasingly shaped by interest-based power and economic influence, developing countries face transformational shifts in development financing. Reductions in foreign aid are forcing international development mechanisms to adapt amid heightened uncertainty, polarization, and shifting donor priorities. At the same time, African nations face mounted pressure to lead the financing of both immediate and long-term development, particularly in addressing shortfalls in food security, healthcare, and education. Most importantly, progress towards African economic sovereignty is reshaping both regional and global power dynamics, as traditional leaders in development financing, including the United States and China, step back from this role. Thus, it becomes imperative that international development institutions and financing structures reinvent themselves to better serve the interests of African states. In an increasingly power-driven global environment, Africa's approach to development financing must reinforce economic sovereignty while recognizing the continued importance of international cooperation. This includes investing in inter-continental trade, reducing brain drain by strengthening employment opportunities, and promoting political leadership and role models at all levels.

"GAP World Stage: The Future of African Development: Africa in a Multipolar World"
Guest Speaker: Dr. Gomez Agou
This event helped inform the paper.
Thank you to the speaker & participants!

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I. Introduction and Background

While Africa's future appears to be on an upward trajectory, with an average life expectancy rising by more than half and a total population doubling over the last thirty years to 1.5 billion inhabitants, the continent still lags behind other regions of the world economically (McDermott, 2025). Twenty-two African countries are now classified as low-income by the World Bank and 24 as lower-middle-income (Cilliers, 2025). When using the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals as a metric for development, Africa has failed to significantly improve in areas like food systems, jobs and social protection, and energy access. Only a third of the target goals show adequate progress (Musau, 2025). Africa's exponentially increasing population also strains resources. It is estimated that by 2050 a quarter of the world's population will be African (Paice, 2022). Per capita income growth has averaged just 1.1 percent a year for the past several decades and youth unemployment exceeds 25 percent (Ecofin Agency, 2025). In terms of hunger, 78 percent more Africans faced food insecurity in 2023 than 2015 and estimates of undernourishment also worsened by a staggering 55 percent. African development and resources will be strained considerably without major changes.

International actors are also turning away from African development. Reductions in official development assistance (ODA) from 2023 to mid-April 2025 have increased from 15 percent to 22 percent, or $41 billion to $60 billion United States dollars (USD), indicating that international aid is on a downward trend as well (McKinsey, 2025). Western countries in particular have tightened their belts; prominent donor countries such as the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have all slashed their budgets for foreign aid due to domestic economic challenges (Guyson, 2025). The United States even dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a move related to the current administration's efforts to freeze all U.S. foreign aid (Kates, 2025). For European countries in particular, concerns over the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine have played a role in redirecting their attention and their pocketbooks away from Africa (Merritt, 2024). Looking eastward, even China's strategic goals in Africa are beginning to shift. While limiting mineral extraction and their direct exposure to African governments, China is aiming to focus on the private sector and investment (Oxford Economics, 2025). The combination of an increasing African population, worsening African livelihoods, and a decrease in international assistance raises the key question: What is the future of African development? What key actors will be involved, and what are their motives and strategies across the continent? Perhaps most importantly, how do African countries see the issue of their development and what is their plan moving forward?

African leaders have already begun to answer the latter question: at the 2025 annual meeting for the African Development Bank Group, Ivorian president Alassane Ouattara called for an emphasis on Africa's economic self-reliance (Yieke, 2025). Some researchers even posit that decrease in international aid might not be so harmful; in fact, acts like dismantling USAID could help foster African self-reliance (Fofack, 2025). Many African leaders, such as those from Ghana, Cameroon, and Nigeria see this as an opportunity to shift away from dependence on other international actors and instead focus on implementing and funding their own durable development efforts (Yieke, 2025; Ghebreyesus, 2025). Going forward, African countries should consider how they can support their own development infrastructure through both political decision making and economic policy refinement.

II. Problem and Issue Description

The current development financing structure was established following the Second World War to rebuild Europe, with three foundational pillars: The IMF for macroeconomic support, the World Bank for long-term development loans, and UN agencies to handle technical assistance and humanitarian work (Ali & Abbood, 2023). “Developed” countries promised that with enough knowledge and financial resources, they would be able to raise “developing” countries to their economic stature.

Dr. Gomez Agou, former senior representative to the IMF has pointed out that the international development architecture created in the 1960s was based on the idea that targeted external financing, combined with domestic reforms, would help accelerate growth and convergence between developing and advanced economies. Yet, despite progress in many areas, income gaps have in some cases widened over time. For example, while G7 incomes were roughly 11 times higher than those of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s, the ratio is estimated today at around 18. He explained that this underscores the need for continued reflection on how to promote sustained, inclusive growth in low-income countries (Agou, 2025).

Despite having a mission of poverty reduction, human rights remains a marginal issue within development finance institutions. Notably, the World Bank has no human rights code, and there are no accountability mechanisms or ways for employees to flag human rights issues. According to Dr. Galit Sarfaty, a professor of law at the University of Toronto specializing in international human rights, human rights are “quite a taboo topic” within the World Bank. On the ground, this had led to many cases of serious human rights abuses being committed in World Bank projects. These violations range from underrepresentation and environmental concerns to forced displacement (Sarfaty, 2025).

Why is this bad?

A dependent financial system with significant power imbalances also leads to exploitation. The US has long used its effective control over international financing systems to impose neoliberal policies, such as austerity measures, and Western-friendly laissez-faire economic policies (Yende, 2025). Much like the neoliberal reforms imposed by the West, China has been known to strategically use its Belt and Road Initiative to leverage high-interest loans and its unseen debt

to possess critical trade hubs and ports in developing countries (Challaney, 2017). Gulf countries have also leveraged their monetary control. United Arab Emirates investment groups, like DP World and AD Ports Group, have taken control of important ports across the Horn of Africa in the name of improvement. Dar es Salaam is an example where the UAE has effective control to operate and “improve” the port for the next thirty years (DP World, 2023).

Why is it failing?

When today’s global financial architecture was designed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, there was no African representation there. Today, African countries still face high borrowing costs, debt distress, and limited fiscal space (Diagne, 2025).

The IMF has a quota-based voting system: votes are distributed based on financial contribution (International Monetary Fund, 2026). This skews the actions of the organization to benefit the interests of large, wealthy donor countries, like the US (Tricontinental Institute for Social Research, 2025). This is often directly against the interests of the developing countries they seek to help, in the form of forced conditions attached to loans, such as austerity measures (Stiglitz, 2002).

The current system is based on the premise that Western, developed countries will always be able to supply the developing world with funding, but as recent trends prove, that is not always the case. There is sometimes an expectation in public debates that the IMF is designed to solve the broader development challenges faced by African countries. Dr. Gomez Agou, Senior IMF Representative in Gabon, clarified that this is not the institution’s mandate. He emphasized that the IMF’s core role has always been to support the stability of the international monetary and financial system and to assist countries facing balance-of-payments pressures. He noted that, while the IMF can play a critical stabilizing role during periods of economic stress, long-term development outcomes depend primarily on domestic policies and on the work of institutions specifically designed for development, such as the World Bank and regional development banks (Agou).

III. Analysis of Factors and Case Studies

Healthcare

Africa has seen a dramatic reduction in foreign development funding and official development assistance (ODA) following the immediate pullout of United States Agency of International Development aid funding in 2025 (Gavin, 2025) (Sabow, 2025). The fluid climate of development financing has been influenced by a multitude of factors, most notably significant changes in foreign government spending for international development projects, heightened uncertainty amongst private sector investors amidst fluctuating global markets, as well as lack of clear communication between local, national, regional, and international development agencies. Importantly, the United States is projected to reduce aid funding the most by nearly 56 percent compared to ODA levels in 2023 – while countries such as Japan and South Korea are increasing foreign ODA spending (Huckstep, 2025). Importantly, shifts to the modern development financing uncertainty have hardly occurred in a vacuum, and instead have been brought about by global shifts towards state economic self-interests, shifts away from fully cooperative multilateral economic, social, and political engagement, as well as increases in military spending by economically-developed countries. Although a discussion of the causes and drivers of shifting development models remains fundamental to comprehending the significance of the current moment, it is important to consider the local, national and regional consequences that are being experienced as a result of shifting development financing patterns. More specifically, this section will address the impacts caused by the changing nature of development financing in critical sectors of healthcare, food insecurity, and education.

Crucially, fragile healthcare systems "are highly exposed to reductions in foreign aid" in many African countries due to the high

share of healthcare funding being sourced from foreign development partners, including other states and development agencies. Importantly, this dependency on foreign development funding in the healthcare sector stems from a potent neoliberal economic model enforced by Western donor countries in which economically developing countries are encouraged to invest into trade and manufacturing rather than social services, partly due to the advantage this brings to donor countries interested in cheaper manufacturing, mineral sourcing, and labor. Similarly, a discussion of the steps taken by national governments and regional actors to combat dramatic changes in development financing remains central to foreseeing the future of economic sovereignty and regional development cooperation amidst changing international funding plans. Firstly, recent years and months have shown dramatic reductions in foreign aid funding, specifically seeing a 44 percent reduction in ODA between 2022 and future fiscal years, seeing a reduction from $39 billion to $22 billion USD (Sabow, 2025). In this view, ramifications of these significant financing shifts in a critical sector are being felt, namely vital healthcare "programs are already experiencing disruptions" in completing critical deliveries of medical supplies as well as in the acquisition of the necessary healthcare materials and funds necessary to support functioning healthcare systems. For example, McKinsey reported that in 2023 the United States accounted for 29 percent of global healthcare funding, while European countries and NATO allies and multilateral actors such as the Asian Development Bank, African Union, World Bank, and World Health Organization contributed 16 percent and 40 percent, respectively. Evidently, the overdependence on multilateral organizations and global economic powerhouses such as the United States has made African nations vulnerable to immediate shocks in these structures and funding practices. Moreover, not only do health systems in many African countries depend most heavily on multilateral funding from global donors, but they are projected to be forced to reckon with the most severe underfunding of 20% foreshadowed by reports from the Center for Global Development (CGD) amongst donor recipient countries.

Additionally, development assistance to health (DAH) is significantly vulnerable to changes in individual donor behavior due to the reliance on a small set of international and regional donors, such as the United States, European members of NATO, and the World Health Organization (Sabow, 2025). In 2025, an OECD report outlined notable reliance of Sub-Saharan African countries on select few donor countries, specifically outlining risks associated with significant reductions in healthcare ODA (OECD, 2025). For example, the report outlined that in 2022 major ODA contributors accounted for approximately 73% of total bilateral ODA in healthcare, with the United States accounting for 51% of that total. For instance, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, South Africa, and Tanzania are highly sensitive to continuing reductions in healthcare directed ODA, as healthcare related ODA accounted for 25% of total bilateral aid received in the past 5 years. Importantly, McKinsey similarly reported that a significant share of countries with heavy reliance on health related ODA were also facing high levels of debt distress. The ramifications of dramatic reductions in ODA are projected to cause immediate human health consequences due to dependence of African countries on foreign medical supply manufacturing and distribution, namely in HIV/AIDS medication and treatment procedures (Okereke, 2025). For example, Nigeria is projected to miss out on nearly $600 million USD in annual health funding – accounting for nearly a fifth of Nigeria's annual health budget – as USAID dramatically reduces health system development financing, and as Botswana simultaneously risks losing a third of its HIV response preparedness financing due to similar reasons (Okereke, 2025).

However, it is important to recognize intentional steps taken by African states to nationalize healthcare providing services to ensure continued access to critical healthcare amidst significant reductions in foreign aid. In response to heightened awareness of the heavy reliance of African countries on external sources of critical healthcare financing, sub-Saharan African countries have become aware of potential detrimental consequences on the efficiency of essential healthcare practices caused by this overdependence. The Accra Health Sovereignty Summit in Ghana is a key example of regional and national initiatives attempting to restructure healthcare funding to prevent overdependency on foreign actors for providing such critical necessities. Set in motion in 2023, the Summit is emblematic of trending visions of African-led restructuring of healthcare systems, and wider development financing schemes, in an effort to ensure that overdependency on foreign ODA is minimized (WHO, 2025). Evidently, the success of this initiative lies in the African leadership that it is founded upon, in which decisions concerning African development are made by African elected political leaders and economic policy-makers.

Moreover, questions of humanitarian assistance and aid as ODA in conflict settings have gained heightened attention following the USAID fallout in Sub-Saharan African countries facing humanitarian crises. African countries receiving the highest levels of ODA tend to be experiencing humanitarian crises or social service pressures, such as in Nigeria, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Yade, 2025).

Food Insecurity

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most food-insecure region in the world (Kemoe, 2022). More than 307 million Africans, around 20 percent of the continent's population, face food insecurity and undernourishment. No region is spared, with East Africa in the most dire condition with over 69 million undernourished Africans. Among the most pressing reasons for this severe food shortage are climate change, violent conflict, and economic instability (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

Africa's food systems are especially vulnerable to shocks from climate change. Rising temperatures, inconsistent rainfall, and natural disasters are becoming more unpredictable as weather patterns across the world shift. However, Africa's agriculture relies predominantly on rain, which places Africa's food security at higher risk than other regions that are not as dependent on rain for crops (African Climate Insights, 2025). Furthermore, climate disasters are more common in Africa in the first place, as a third of the world's droughts occur in Africa, where countries like Chad face brutal flooding (Kemoe, 2022). The agricultural industries of low and middle-income countries in particular, which have less funding to spare for climate-conscious technologies and policies, will be hit the hardest.

Conflict is a major driver of hunger: approximately 82 percent of food insecure Africans in 2023 were in areas affected by conflict (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2023). Violence impacts food production and transport by disrupting crucial supply chains and transactions that provide food to markets and households. Food insecurity itself may also lead to increased violence through competition for limited food resources, which in turn continues a positive feedback loop of widespread hunger (Muriuki, 2023). Violence abroad, namely the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has also indirectly caused worsened food supplies in Africa by inciting a blockade which affected low-income countries most harshly (Bonnafont, 2025).

As global humanitarian aid funding diminishes, critical operations for supplying food to vulnerable areas in Africa are facing severe underfunding; thus, 13.7 million Africans already at risk could be pushed to even harsher levels of extreme hunger. Some of these programs in South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and the DRC have been downsized: now, recipients either receive reduced rations or are cut off entirely. The UN World Food Programme expects to receive 40 percent less funding throughout 2025 (World Food Programme, 2025).

It is clear that Africa must find other options to address food insecurity without foreign development assistance. However, while this foreign assistance can be helpful in preventing famine in the short-term, it often fails to benefit African industries in the long-term. Foreign aid practices often prioritize profit and extractive practices, instead of looking to bolster existing local systems. Donor countries aim not only to provide necessary aid to recipient countries, but also to strengthen their own international reputation. As Nancy Rapando, Director of Global Government Partnerships at the One Acre Fund said, "While aid is beneficial, it should not dictate the system" (Mancinelli & Abraham, 2024). Overreliance on food from abroad is pervasive in Africa; almost 80 percent of basic food consumed in Africa in 2020 was imported from outside of the continent. Relying on food imports can also increase government budget deficits because many African countries subsidize food imports. Moreover, relying on agriculture outside of Africa can also hinder the growth and foundations of agriculture within Africa, hurting farmers and any chance of self-sufficient food systems (Ngassam, 2025). When considering the harmful effects of climate change, violence, and supply chain shocks, Africa governments must prioritize establishing self-reliant agriculture systems that prove to be stable even in the event of unpredictable catastrophes.

Education

With a rapidly expanding youth population, Africa stands at a pivotal point in determining responses to urgent reforms needed in educational mechanisms and educational financing structures. With approximately 40 percent of the continent's population aged 15 years or younger, it is imperative that shortages in teaching faculty, educational resources and facilities, as well as education policy-making are addressed in order to ensure accessibility to quality education for all youth throughout Africa (Saifaddin, 2024). As most recent data projections suggest, Africa will have nearly 600 million individuals part of the workforce, composed largely of youth groups.

According to the most recent UNESCO report on the state of education in Africa, while significant progress has been achieved in ensuring access to quality education – measured by the number of children attending primary and secondary school – steps-back in ensuring adequate access to quality education have caused international alarm (UNESCO, 2024). More specifically, while the total number of children in school has increased by 75 million since 2015, the number of "out-of-school children" has also seen an increase of 13.2 million, reaching 100 million affected youth in 2025 (UNESCO, 2025). Furthermore, lack of evidenced improvement in the quality of education – defined as consistent learning outcomes across schools – further worries donor countries and development financing institutions, seeing as the likelihood of the typical student in Africa having a qualified teacher and access to basic infrastructure and necessities is equivalent to students from 10 years ago (UNESCO, 2025).

Recent decades have witnessed alarming declines in African educational security,specifically facing significant teaching shortages, inadequate educational infrastructure, and ineffective political leadership at both the local and national levels (Nephitaly & Modupe, 2025). These critical challenges are placing more strain on national governments already tackling severe budget cuts from various social sectors as a result of reductions in foreign development financing. For one, sub-Saharan African countries are facing pervasive challenges, namely a teacher shortage of nearly 15 million trained faculty.

Dependency on foreign development aid in the educational sector is a critical vulnerability for African states. While aid allocated directly to education in African states has seen an incremental increase since 2021, this aid remains sourced from a select five major sources, namely the World Bank, France, the United States, Germany, and the European Union (UNESCO, 2024). This reliance on a select few foreign donors has forced African countries to scramble to fill the gaps in education financing created by recent reductions in United States foreign development assistance spending. Thus, strengthening African educational institutions through internal funding and structural reforms led by African decision-making institutions is necessary to both ensure critical access to education for Africa's growing population, and to bring about restructuring of educational institutions to better serve visions of Africa tomorrow.

Importantly, foreign aid directed towards educational purposes, that is the amount of aid given to African institutions for the purposes of education, saw a dramatic decrease between 2020 and 2021 – primarily due to increased spending on domestic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic – and has since remained between \$4 billion and \$5 billion USD per annum (UNESCO, 2024). However, the dismantling of USAID in 2025 has once more forced a chasm in education financing in donor funding recipient countries. More specifically, the "abrupt cancellation" of a total of 396 education programmes across 58 states has the potential to cause long-term damage to these countries' workforces and increase youth unemployment (Walls, 2025). From a certain perspective, this offers the European Union the opportunity to take leadership in supporting African educational institutions in becoming self-reliant and self-directed.

Addressing over-reliance on foreign ODA in the educational sector demands a systematic lens shift that "reimagines education not just as schooling but as a holistic and ongoing process for the development" of the wider society (Nephitaly & Modupe, 2025). Thus, African governments must be supported in the short term by viable educational financing options – such as through the African Union or the establishment of sovereign education funds or taxation schemes – and encouraged in the long-term to establish progressive financial institutions that prioritize education spending in primary and secondary schooling, foreseeing the benefits of literary and skills development for leading youth populations.

IV . Policy Options

Finally, it is important to consider policy recommendations intended strengthen African leadership in furthering economic and human development. In lieu of the significance of economic sovereignty for the future of African economic and human development that stands independent of foreign ODA, it is imperative that the next steps in economic decision-making are done by African leaders with their respective countries' interests, as well as those of the continent as a whole, in mind. More specifically, these policy recommendations center around furthering intracontinental trade, advocating for role models, promoting effective leadership, preventing brain drain, and adopting holistic success metrics for development.

Furthering Intracontinental Trade

Since the enactment of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2021, intracontinental trade has noticeably contributed to achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. By reducing tariffs and harmonizing customs and policies, international trade within Africa has the effect of boosting economic growth and development for all countries involved (Mene, 2025). Intracontinental trade allows countries to specialize in certain industries, allowing countries to benefit from comparative advantage. By introducing markets to international competition, furthermore, intracontinental trade promotes innovation and policies designed to encourage higher productivity, creating incentives that work towards sustainable development. Governments should work to continue reducing barriers to trade with other African countries and supporting growth within the continent in mutually beneficial agreements.

Advocating for Role Models

Africa should look to other examples of successful development in previously low-income countries. Namely, in Asia, where countries such as China and Japan saw rapid increases in GDP and quality of life under the guidance of strong leadership and effective development policies (Jullens, 2014). When these countries were promoted as role models of effective development, other Asian countries began to follow suit and enact similar policies.

Asian development serves as a relatively comparable path to Africa's future potential. Both regions suffer from the effects of colonization, however, Asian development has had some positive role models that became economically successful relatively quickly. African leaders and visible international organizations, like the IMF and the UN, need to focus on promoting successful examples of development within Africa in order to encourage other countries to follow suit and convince other leaders of the feasibility of self-reliant development. Some possible role models that have become economically successful within Africa include Rwanda, where the economy has exhibited strong growth with an average growth rate of 8.4 percent over the period 2022 to 2024. This economic success was largely driven by robust investment and growth in services (World Bank, 2025).

Promoting Effective Leadership

Political leadership is a highly influential factor in African economic development. For sustained long-term development, African leaders must strive to look to the future, not only to their next opportunity for reelection. Currently, some African leaders view development as an opportunity to implement projects that will strengthen their campaign over projects that prioritiz long-term impact. Large airports, stadiums, and urban beautification projects are prioritized over improving schools and roads (Anochie, 2025). Through a more comprehensive, long-term perspective, though, African leaders can encourage development and further their own chances of reelection at the same time. Consecutive Afrobarometer surveys indicate a high level of disapproval of citizens towards their leadership based on unsuccessful development initiatives (Signe, 2018). By focusing on long-term development projects with the public's best interest in mind, leaders can win over their citizens by acknowledging their opinions and concerns.

Preventing Brain Drain

While Africa has the largest population of youth in the world, with 70 percent of sub-Saharan Africa under the age of 30, it is critical that talent does not leave Africa. Currently, youth unemployment in Africa exceeds 25 percent (Ecofin Agency, 2025). If Africa is able to create more attractive job opportunities, a younger workforce can support booming economic growth (Rezaei, 2025). Currently, talent moves away from Africa in search for for better workplace conditions, opportunities for professional growth, higher salaries, and more resources for enhancing career prospects (Kanyesigye, 2025). Governments should invest in training and education programs to enhance the younger workforce's skills and implement worker-oriented minimum wage policies. The effect is two-fold: investing in foundational aspects of the workforce not only directly improves productivity and efficiency, but also strengthens confidence in job prospects in Africa, encouraging youth to stay and contribute to their domestic economies.

Holistic Success Metrics

Development cannot be measured only through economic success and must also be considered in light of self-determination and human rights. Without local participation and enthusiasm, development projects and initiatives are doomed to fail. Crucially, countries with stronger levels of self-determination, the ability to make their own political and economic choices without international coercion, have historically been more successful in development. In Botswana, the well-managed diamond industry has brought prosperity across the country; in Rwanda, the government has invested in foundational programs like education and healthcare aimed at improving the well-being of their citizens (Odjo, 2024).

Regarding human rights, precautions against human rights abuses are not seriously considered in development projects. There are also many kinds of abuses that need to be considered; examples of violations include not only child labor and unsafe working conditions, but also the indirect effects of pollution and displacing local communities (Sarfaty, 2025). If governments and international organizations hope to produce beneficial development projects, they must include local participation. At the planning level, these projects should have local community members involved in some way. For example, development organizations and companies should incorporate advising committees made up of locals in their projects. Without local input, projects will not suit the needs of local communities, setting them up for failure.

V. Conlcusion & Next Steps

Foreign aid and development assistance have entered a new era where former major donors, like the United States, are pulling back from prior aid commitments. The prior structure of development assistance, while sometimes helpful in the short-term, proved to cause overdependence on donor countries from the East and West, reinforcing imperial and colonial hierarchical dependencies. Especially in critical sectors such as healthcare, food insecurity, and education, fluctuating priorities from donors have exposed the fragility of the development financing mechanisms imposed upon economically developing African nations. Africa's population will only keep growing and development funding must keep up if further humanitarian crises like famine and shortages of medical supplies are ever to be resolved.

In the face of this shifting aid landscape, African governments are increasingly moving to become self-reliant in their own development For the future, African countries should consider factors like intercontinental trade and preventing brain drain. These countries should also look closer at the fundamental decision-making level and work to promote effective leadership and positive examples of African development. Furthermore, to ensure that development is not only focused on the economic results, but also humane ones, governments must establish human rights protocols for development protocols. As global shifts in political power and economic influence continue to disrupt traditional patterns of trade and dependence, Africa must take ownership of its next steps going forward.

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